Perhaps offering a window into the old philosophical determinism debate, or fate versus chaos, theoretical physics deals with the same dichotomy, and has succeeded in empirically justifying both sides of the coin. Annoyingly, just like its cousin, metaphysics seems to be missing some sort of necessary link between the two, or ideally, an all-encompassing third candidate.

How can the complete randomness of quantum theory cooperate with general relativity, when in effect, GR encompasses entirely predictable determinations? While string theory is elegantly positioned for such a task, it necessarily seems contrived. The theory, of course, falls outside the realm of experience and thus defies experiential concurrence, which questions its very nature as a theory.

Abstracting for a moment to the realm of numbers and probability, we can curiously observe a similar incongruence between what seems to be a random driving force and, deterministic outcome. Taking the flip of a coin as an example, it is in essence absolutely impossible to predict with absolute certainty the outcome of the toss. Yet, as the frequency of flips approaches infinity, the outcome distribution NECESSARILY approaches 50/50. Consequently, at infinity we assume exactly 50/50 distribution. So, what makes the randomness that we started with become exactitude? It is clearly linked to the number of POSSIBLITIES with which random potentiality is faced. We know that there are two possibilities with the coin toss, and thus from this, derive the necessary distribution of outcomes as frequency approaches infinity. The question is…When the initial number of possibilities is unknown, is it possible to derive necessary outcome distributions? And more importantly, does this derivation correspond to the link between QT and GR?

In other words, does probability theory, extended to infinity, dilute “chance” to the point absolute determinism?

Sigh…..time for a drink.

Enash Doog

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June 19, 2007

Categories: Physics . . Author: enashdoog

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